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1. Introduction   
The Social Protection Committee (SPC) is the main forum for exchanging information and 
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Coordination (OMC) in the fields of social protection and social inclusion. Its role is important 
for several reasons. First, committee members coming from national ministries are the ones 
who are mainly responsible – together with the European Commission – for developing 
European level policy frameworks (i.e. common objectives, guidelines and opinions) in social 
policy areas. Second, these national delegates represent a key link between European and 
national administrations: Policy “uploading” and “downloading” (Börzel 2002) go through the 
SPC. Finally, while the SPC was established by a Council Decision and its tasks are included 
in the EC Treaty, no detailed instructions are given about its working practices. Hence, the 
OMC and the SPC in particular largely rely on semi-formal governance practices (Christiansen 
and Piattoni 2004), which means that committee members themselves are responsible for 
establishing the informal ‘rules of the game’ according to which the OMC can work (Horvath 
2008). Therefore, their regular exchanges in committee meetings heavily influence the 
effective functioning of the whole coordination process. As will be explained below, 
effectiveness in this context refers to the effectiveness of communicative interactions and the 
effective participation of committee members. Both of these factors are linked to policy-
making within the OMC: The uploading and downloading of policy objectives.  
The concept of effectiveness is usually defined as the capacity of the OMC to influence 
national-level policy-making. In other words, it refers to the OMC’s “potential to transform the 
practices of the member states” (Jacobsson 2004: 356). The keyword of analysis in this case is
‘policy learning’. Empirical assessments on the potentials of the OMC to enhance policy 
learning usually map changes – frame shifts or policy changes – at the national level. The 
results depend on the analysed country and the policy issue. Therefore, conclusions vary 
widely (for a broad overview, see Kröger this issue and Zeitlin 2009). This article takes a 
different approach to assessing effectiveness: It focuses on the policy-making process at the 
European level. Thus, the article does not deal with the domestic implementation of European 
policies, but looks at how their very construction is influenced by organisational factors. This 
process is crucial in understanding how the OMC can induce national level impacts. As many 
argue, if European level policy principles are the results of an open, equal and consensual 
decision-making process, member states are more likely to become committed to their
implementation (Jacobsson 2004; Puetter 2006).  
Therefore, this article focuses on how and when the SPC can work effectively and assumes 
that taking into account both the uploading and the downloading dimension of policy-making 
is crucial in understanding the potentials of the OMC (see also Vanhercke this issue). Since 
committee delegates, together with other key actors, define the acceptable and desirable modes 
of interactions – i.e. the goals and rules of committee meetings and the principles of
communication among representatives – the success of these interactions is also to a large 
extent tied to their own perceptions of effectiveness. Therefore, instead of analysing the 
operation of the SPC based on pre-defined indicators of effectiveness, the article looks at 
participants’ perceptions in order to reconstruct abstract categories based on which the actors
themselves evaluate their own working practices. From a methodological point of view, this 
implies an inductive research design.  
Yet, the article does not want to suggest that the effective functioning of the SPC – and in turn 
the OMC – only depends on committee members’ perceptions. Certainly, external factors such 
as the political framework in which the SPC operates cannot be neglected. Nevertheless, since 
previous empirical analyses have rarely opened the ‘black box’ of committee level 
interactions, the present analysis emphasises the importance of SPC members’ interpretations 
and their perceptions on the functioning of the committee. As will be discussed below, such 
focus includes looking at how committee representatives reconstruct the external political 
framework of their organisation.  
Against this background, the article has thus two main goals. First, based on an analysis of 
interviews, it lists the criteria of effectiveness linked to both national and European-level 
factors that SPC members rely on when evaluating the work of their own committee. The 
result of such an analysis is the detailed specification of categories, which can provide an 
© 2009 by Anna Horvath
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-017a.htm 2insight into how and when the “social OMC” (CEC 2008) can function effectively. Second, 
based on the abstract concepts of effectiveness identified on the basis of in-depth interviews, 
the article formulates more general hypotheses about the effective functioning of EU level 
committees. These can be used as bases for future deductive research.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief overview about the 
internal functioning and the policy environment of the SPC. This provides the basis for 
choosing the interpretative theoretical and methodological framework that is discussed in the 
third section. The article then turns to the empirical case study on prevailing perceptions of 
effectiveness within the SPC. This empirical section consists of four main parts: It reviews 
how participating actors themselves perceive the main functions of the SPC, outlines how they 
perceive the organisation of interactions within the SPC, discusses how actors interpret the 
individual and organisational conditions for effective participation, and finally constructs the 
abstract categories of effectiveness. In doing so, the analysis connects perceptions of effective 
participation with competing or complementary definitions of the SPC. The final section 
presents the conclusions.  
2. The Social Protection Committee: Organisational and policy context   
The SPC was established by Council Decision 2000/436/EC in 2000 and was re-established 
with slight modifications by Council Decision 2004/689/EC in 2004. As was mentioned above, 
it is the main “vehicle”(1) for exchanging information among EU member states and the 
Commission in the areas of social protection and social inclusion. In other words, this 
committee is the main forum for policy coordination among member state representatives 
where delegates discuss and debate about policy objectives, guidelines and opinions. The main 
tasks of the SPC include monitoring the social situation in the different member states, 
promoting the exchanges of information, preparing reports and formulating opinions on 
diverse subjects and initiatives (Council of the European Union 2000, 2004). This implies that 
the SPC is the site where “much of the consensus-building within the OMC” takes place 
(Armstrong 2003: 181).  
In addition, committee members – two delegates from national ministries and two 
representatives of the European Commission – represent a central link between national and 
European administrations. This has two important aspects. On the one hand, the SPC is “an 
interface between the Commission and the Council” (Armstrong 2003: 181), thus between the 
Commission and member states. As such, it is the forum which shapes the European agenda 
(uploading dimension). On the other hand, committee members play a crucial role in 
influencing the position of national bureaucrats both about the OMC as a mode of governance 
and regarding the policy issues it deals with (downloading dimension). Hence, SPC members 
influence the potential of the OMC also through persuading or discouraging national civil 
servants concerning its significance (de la Porte, Natali and Pochet 2009).  
The SPC is dealing with the issue areas of social protection and social inclusion. The first 
policy area in which the SPC has been involved is social inclusion, which was followed most 
importantly by the adequacy and sustainability of pension systems and health and long-term 
care. These policy areas are interesting for several reasons. First of all, social protection and 
social inclusion are “politically sensitive” issues where the competence of the EU has always 
been questioned (Radaelli 2003). Daly (2007: 2) describes social policy within the EU as 
“fitful”, since there are “periods of intense activity followed by times when social policy is
hardly spoken of”. The launching of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 meant a new opportunity “to 
realise a model of social policy organised around social exclusion as the problem definition”, 
choosing the OMC as the “policy-making methodology” in this field (Daly 2007: 3). Yet, the 
re-launching of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, which refocused the strategy on growth and jobs
at the expense of social cohesion, changed the status this coordination process. This made it 
more important for social policy actors to justify and prove their political significance.  
The specificity of the institutional environment of the SPC is that it operates within a 
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areas where problems and their importance are easily contested and redefined. Furthermore, 
the formal rules based on which the SPC operates are relatively vague, which means that 
committee members themselves have a crucial role in developing the working methods 
themselves. Such committees are often conceptualised as transnational governance 
“networks”, where interactions “take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and 
imaginary framework” (Sørensen and Torfing 2007: 9). Governance networks have the 
potential to “establish a framework for consensus building” (ibid.: 13). In the context of the 
OMC, such an institutional framework is often described as experimental governance (Sabel 
and Zeitlin 2006; Szyszczak 2006; Zeitlin 2005). The framework of democratic 
experimentalism focuses on the role of informal and flexible governance arrangements that 
facilitate the revision of institutional and policy standards through the process of consensus-
seeking deliberation in multi-level fora.  
The consequence of such a governance setting is that the ways in which committee members 
perceive their own role and the organisation they act in have significant consequences for the 
actual effective operation of the SPC and in turn, the OMC. First, communicative interactions 
have to be developed in a way that they facilitate consensus-seeking. If committee members do 
not perceive these interactions as potentially resulting in consensual solutions – thus as being 
effective – they will not engage in discussions, which in turn makes it impossible for the SPC 
to function effectively. This also influences the commitments of member states to implement 
the objectives of the OMC (downloading dimension). Certainly, the nature and purpose of such 
a consensus as well as the circumstances under which it might be reached has to be defined 
and embraced by committee members themselves. Second, committee members have to be 
able to participate in committee discussions effectively. Again, since the OMC depends on the 
self-commitments of member states and such a commitment starts with the engagement of SPC 
members, each one of them has to believe that they are able to participate effectively and 
influence the discussion (uploading dimension).  
Organisational analyses that examine the perceptions and interactions of the members of 
specific committees usually focus on the way in which the organisation of committees (e.g. 
membership, meetings, etc.) influences the roles, identities and behaviour of committee 
members and vice versa, how the perceived roles of committee members shape the 
organisation of interactions (see e.g. de la Porte, Natali and Pochet 2009; Egeberg 2004; 
Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 2003; Thedvall 2005). In these cases, committees are often 
conceptualised as arenas or sites of socialisation for national civil servants, where committee 
members evoke new roles which shape their identities (Egeberg 2004). For example, based on 
participant observation, Thedvall (2005) analyses how the meeting format shapes decision-
making in the Employment Committee (EMCO) as well as how it influences the role 
perceptions of committee members.  
A recent organisational analysis of the SPC and the EMCO was conducted by de la Porte, 
Natali and Pochet (2009). In their article, the authors examine the means of socialisation and 
self-governance within these two committees. They argue that members of the SPC and the 
EMCO have three main roles: A “policy reform” role, an “expertocratic” role and a 
“technocratic” role (ibid.). They also examine the perceived strength of individual committee
members in influencing discussions and find that the main factors that play an important role 
are the length of membership and language skills. Finally, the authors also confirm that the 
organisation of interactions within these two OMC committees is predominantly consensus-
based (ibid.).  
The present case study also includes a micro-level organisational analysis of a specific 
committee, but differs from previous studies in several respects. First of all, in contrast to 
many analyses on committees, it does not include pre-given hypotheses about relevant 
organisational factors that influence a socialisation process (e.g. conditions of deliberation), 
but looks at committee members’ perceptions as a first step. Second, it links these perceptions
of effectiveness and the sources of effective participation explicitly to the potential functions 
of the SPC and the roles of its members. Thus, the article does not examine organisational 
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purposes of their actions. Instead, it acknowledges that first, committee members’ interactions 
are embedded in a political context that is reconstructed and given meaning(s) to by committee 
delegates themselves, and second, that the effective operation of the SPC is dependent on this 
reconstruction process. The next section presents an analytical framework that is useful in 
helping to evaluate such perceptions.  
3. Theoretical and methodological assumptions   
Analyses that focus on the ways in which actors involved in governance processes perceive, 
enact, and make sense of them rely on the concept of inter-subjectivity. The inter-subjective 
construction(2) of governance arrangements implies the following assumptions. On the one
hand, institutions are designed on the basis of normative principles of appropriateness that 
guide institutional practice. These normative principles influence actors’ perceptions and 
interactions within a given organisational structure. On the other hand, the principles are 
communicated and performed by actors who take part in this practice. Thus, discursive 
interactions within this structure contribute to the re-construction of these normative 
principles. In other words, institutions shape and legitimise the interactions of actors and vice 
versa: Actors who participate in policy processes discursively enact and legitimise governance 
arrangements.  
This “performance” (Hajer 2006) and meaning-making through continuous contestation 
(Wiener 2007) brings about “living institutions” (Olsen 2000) through the process of 
institutionalisation (Olsen 1997). When actors start to enact and interpret certain organisational 
rules and norms and they do so in a more and more regular way, the process of 
institutionalisation starts. Olsen (1997) defines institutionalisation as a process that involves  
1. “structuralization and routinization of behaviour”;  
2. “standardization, homogenization and authorization of codes of meaning and ways of
reasoning”; and  
3. “linking resources to values and world-views” (Olsen 1997: 213).  
This article is concerned about the first and the last aspects: the organisation of interactions as 
well as the relationship between institutional stories and the perception of resources. These two 
factors are strongly connected to effectiveness and effective participation within a given 
institutional setting. 
The concept of institutionalisation is applied to the OMC by Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008). 
They conceptualise the OMC as a process of institutionalisation “in which new social fields 
are created at the intersection of the European and the national politics and 
administrations” (ibid.: 505). As the authors argue, these social fields have their own “actors, 
organizations, issues, interests and rules of interpretation and appropriateness” (Heidenreich 
and Bischoff 2008: 505). Thus, the institutionalisation process includes the continuous 
redefinition of the ‘rules of the game’ according to actors’ interests, the development and 
standardisation of appropriate patterns of behaviour based on formal and informal rules, and 
the formation of common frames of references (Heidenreich and Bischoff 2008: 506). While it 
is the overall level of institutionalisation that determines potentials for mutual learning within 
this framework, the development of common frames of references in which committees have a 
key role is seen as a crucial element (see also López-Santana 2006). This also highlights the 
importance of looking at how these common frames of references become accepted at the 
European level.  
The first element of institutionalisation in the framework of Olsen (1997), the 
“structuralization and routinization of behaviour” within governance arrangements, can be 
interpreted as the mode of interaction: The way of discussing, communicating and interpreting 
issues. Modes of interaction or “requirements of communication” (March and Olsen 1995: 
175) become conventionalised, well-established and legitimate through an institutionalisation 
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decision-making procedures. These procedures influence the effectiveness of committee
meetings – how far these meetings fulfil their goals – and through this, the effective 
functioning of the OMC.  
Concerning resources, March and Olsen (1995: 92) distinguish four types of resources or 
“capabilities”. These are “rights and authorities”, “political resources”, “political 
competencies” and “organizing capacity”, all of which develop distinctively within specific 
governance arrangements. Within the framework of this article, these resources or capabilities 
are conceptualised to be inter-subjective: They are dependent on the perceptions and 
interpretations of actors that evolve through discursive practices. Thus, individual and 
organisational capabilities and resources are seen as context-dependent, so are power and 
authority. Examples for such context-specific resources in a policy-shaping institutional setting 
can be, for example, “technical knowledge”, the “seniority” of participants, “credibility, 
professional reputation and respectability” (Puetter 2006: 25-26), “personal authority”, or 
“expertise” (Tallberg 2008). These resources influence the effective participation of committee
delegates through shaping power relationships among actors, the sources of authority, as well 
as actors’ opportunities to upload specific issues to the European level.  
In order to map perceptions about the effective organisation of interactions and sources of 
effective participation, the case study of this article follows an interpretive and inductive 
research strategy. Focusing on the nature of interactions and the relevant resources of 
participants, it includes the micro-analysis of an organisation, where important organisational
characteristics are not hypothesised a priori.  
The article relies on the analysis of forty-five semi-structured, anonymous interviews(3) with 
member state representatives of the SPC, officials of the European Commission, social affairs 
attachés and counsellors from permanent representations who participate in SPC meetings 
more or less regularly, as well as NGO representatives observing the work of the committee. 
Since the analytical framework of the article centres on the concept of inter-subjectivity, the 
relevant actors to be interviewed were the ones who actively participate in the inter-subjective 
construction of the SPC and its governance and policy framework. In this case, the opinion of 
‘outsiders’ was supposed to be less relevant for the internal institutionalisation process, since
they do not have the possibility to contest or perform the rules of the game or the policy 
principles (they might do so indirectly, but then this indirect impact is reflected in the opinion 
of participating actors). Furthermore, while external factors of effectiveness are not dealt with 
explicitly in this article, their influence on the functioning of the SPC is taken into account to 
the extent of their impact on the perceptions of SPC members. In other words, it is assumed 
that committee members reconstruct and give meaning to the external political framework of 
the SPC and this shapes their perceptions of its effectiveness.  
4. Perceptions of effectiveness within the SPC   
The analysis of the SPC that follows in this section consists of four main parts. First, 
participating actors’ interpretations about the main functions of the committee are presented. 
These interpretations give invaluable insights about actors’ own definitions of the SPC and the 
OMC as a whole. One needs to look at these definitions since conceptions of effectiveness are 
linked to the perceived goals of the SPC and the OMC. Thus, these definitions are the starting 
points in actors’ evaluations about appropriate patterns of behaviour and the necessary 
resources needed for effective participation in the committee. The second sub-section links 
such definitions with evaluations of the organisation of interactions within the committee. The 
third sub-section reviews how delegates perceive the conditions for effective participation in 
the SPC and the distribution of resources within the committee. Relationships between 
perceived resources and the competing or complementary definitions of the SPC are also 
analysed. Finally, the last sub-section summarises the empirical findings and presents the
resulting categories of effectiveness. 
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There are two main broader functions of the SPC that can be distinguished based the on 
interviews: A ‘political forum’ and a ‘policy forum’ function. The following quote summarises 
these two functions or ‘pillars’ well:  
“There is the political process, which is linked to the NAPs, to the monitoring, to 
strengthening the EU dimension. And then there is (…) the mutual learning 
process, which is more directed to policy developments at the national level, and 
it is more about exchange of policy and policy transfer” (Interview NGO, 
October 2007).  
Accordingly, the perceived political forum function of the SPC is to promote the visibility of 
social issues at the European level. In addition, in its policy forum function, the SPC has to 
provide a platform for exchanging information and it has to promote policy learning. Radaelli 
(2003: 12) referred to this double role of the SPC as policy “learning in a political context”, 
drawing attention to contradictions inherent in its institutional design. Such potential 
contradictions are analysed here in the context of effectiveness.  
The political forum function of the SPC was referred to by seventeen SPC members (both from 
capitals and from permanent representations) and its fulfilment was questioned by only two of 
them. In a more detailed description, this function of the committee is to send input to the 
Employment and Social Affairs Council, and in turn to the European Council. Sending such 
key messages shows that “member states have a common vision on what the main policy 
priorities are to be achieved” (Interview COM, April 2006). Here lies the political nature of the
SPC: This process aims to put social issues on the European agenda to increase their visibility 
on the European level and “to strengthen the social pillar of Lisbon” (Interview NGO, October 
2007).  
Such a “common vision” or common opinions are seen to be the results of a consensual 
process in which all views are taken into account. Thus, achieving a consensual opinion or a 
compromise during SPC meetings is argued to be central because the SPC is formulating 
opinions on several subjects, which can highlight the importance of certain policies. In other 
words, the SPC needs to send “ministers a clear message understood by the whole
committee” (Interview SPC17, May 2006) in order to fulfil its goal of being a “social 
voice” (Interview COM, April 2006).  
In parallel to its political forum function, the SPC is also often described as a policy forum. 
This was articulated by thirty SPC members. Nevertheless, though the policy forum function 
of the SPC was more often referred to than its political forum function, its fulfilment was also 
questioned by a greater proportion of its advocates (exactly half): Fifteen SPC members 
claimed that the SPC could not fulfil its policy forum function. This function of the SPC is to 
provide a platform for SPC delegates to engage in more detailed discussions on “important 
policy matters” (Interview SPC/PR3, September 2007), which have the potential to induce
changes at the national level. For example, in this view, the added value of the SPC “is 
definitely more looking at the quantitative side, at indicators, monitoring certain processes, 
exchanging information and looking at best practices” (Interview SPC16, March 2006).  
In the policy forum function of the SPC, dialogue is seen to be the instrument of the “exchange 
of knowledge and science” (Interview SPC/PR9, September 2007). The SPC is seen as a 
“conceptual committee” in which delegates can talk to all their “colleagues to try to understand 
their position” regardless of existing differences in perspectives (Interview SPC5, March 
2006). Thus, the SPC is regarded as a forum in which mutual exchange is supposed to 
strengthen “evidence-based policy-making” (Interview SPC12, March 2006) and the 
“analytical capacity” at the national and the European level (Interview COM, September
2007).  
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as important parts of the operation of the SPC. Nevertheless, some interviewees evaluated 
these goals as being the elements of competing rather than complementary definitions of the 
purposes of the committee. These actors perceived potential tensions and contradictions 
between these functions. For example, as one of the delegates noted, some think “that the 
Social Protection Committee was a sort of draft meeting for the Council; I do not think that 
this would be the purpose, I think we have to discuss” (Interview SPC3, September 2007).  
Such a tension can be linked to competing definitions of appropriate patterns of behaviour and 
that of the appropriate functioning of the committee. For example, if the goal is to have a 
dialogue over policy problems and practices, then in an effective meeting, everyone can take 
the floor and share opinions with others. On the contrary, if the meeting serves the purpose of 
finding a consensus about a politically important document, then an effective meeting is 
relatively short where delegates do not come up with critical remarks and thus where a 
common position is easily accepted by all participants. Such organisational aspects are 
discussed in the next sub-section.  
4.2. Organisation of interactions at the European level   
The effectiveness of the organisation of interactions or the routinisation of modes of 
communication has to be linked to the above definitions of the SPC. As was argued 
beforehand, perceptions of effectiveness are necessarily tied to how appropriate behaviour is 
defined. The present section identifies criteria of effectiveness based on an examination of 
critical remarks made by interviewees. This strategy was chosen because critical observations 
can more specifically highlight which factors are perceived to be necessary for the effective 
functioning of the SPC. As the previous sub-section showed, most critical remarks made about 
the operation of the SPC can be linked to the policy forum function of the committee. Since 
the political forum function of the SPC was rarely criticised, it is more difficult to establish 
criteria of effectiveness related to this definition. Nevertheless, conclusions are drawn also in 
this case.  
Factors listed by interviewees as influencing the depth of discussions are often connected to 
the large number of committee representatives. Group size is a well-known factor influencing 
the quality of discussions (see Bailer, Hertz and Leuffen 2009). After the 2004 enlargement of 
the EU, the number of delegates almost doubled in the SPC. Although the SPC established 
new rules of procedure (Horvath 2008), discussions are often seen as still not going smoothly 
with 27 member states on board. On the one hand, new rules limiting discussion time 
encourage passivity. On the other hand, a few interviewees claimed that the new rules are not 
applied rigorously enough and that “everybody is still talking” (Interview SPC/PR3, 
September 2007), which results in long and often repetitive meetings where delegates hope 
that “not everybody will speak” (Interview SPC3, September 2007). As a result – and also due 
to the packed agenda of the SPC – interviewees often complained about the problem that only 
formal or procedural issues are discussed in the SPC (e.g. the wording of documents) and not 
important policy matters.  
This large number of committee representatives is also often linked to the high turnover rate in 
SPC membership, which has important consequences. Most importantly, discussions become 
more difficult since several members do not know about previous agreements (Horvath 2008). 
In addition, because “personal contacts are very important” in the committee, members states 
with a changing representation have more difficulties to get their points across (Interview 
SPC/PR2, September 2007). This high turnover rate is especially a problem in the case of SPC 
representatives from newer member states, mostly due to the small size of their countries and 
the fewer resources available (Horvath 2008).  
In relation to the political forum function of the SPC, concerns are less connected to the 
organisation of interactions within the SPC. Instead, a few interviewees referred to problems 
related to the nature of interactions between the SPC and other relevant committees such as the 
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between the SPC and the other two committees became particularly important after the re-
launching of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, which refocused the strategy on jobs and growth. 
Especially since then, the SPC regularly produces joint opinions with the EMCO, and 
sometimes – though much less frequently – with the EPC. Interviewees argued that these inter-
committee interactions are not symmetric and that the SPC is weaker than the other two 
committees. As a result, joint opinions are said to reflect more the opinions of the other 
committees, which makes it impossible for the SPC to express a “strong opinion” on social 
policy issues (Interview SPC8, January 2008). If SPC members feel that their opinion is not 
taken into account, it is less likely that they find it important to push forward certain issues and 
to find consensual solutions, which then can weaken political commitments and also the SPC.  
To sum up, the above organisational issues influence the work of the SPC regardless of its 
assumed functions. Nevertheless, the problem of the large number of committee members is 
perceived to be more relevant for the policy forum function of the SPC, since this function 
involves more the presence of in-depth policy discussions. Political decisions might be made
even with the presence of a large number of members or with a heavy agenda. Changing 
membership can be disadvantageous from both perspectives: If new members do not respect 
previous decisions, it might cause problems in reaching a consensus. Finally, the political 
importance of the SPC vis-à-vis other committees is more important assuming the political 
function of the SPC, since this function is inherently linked to the weight of SPC decisions in 
the political coordination process.  
4.3. Sources of effective participation: Actors’ individual and organisational 
resources  
Relationships between actors and power distributions can influence the effective participation 
of committee representatives. Therefore, it is essential to examine how resources are perceived 
to be distributed within the SPC and to link such perceptions with the main functions of the 
committee.  
The first and most obvious resource in SPC meetings is the ability to intervene in discussions, 
which can be related to both individual factors and those linked to the organisation of 
discussions. While several interviewees argued that “there is no real barrier to 
contribution” (Interview SPC2, March 2006), others listed a number of factors that indeed
influence who can be part of SPC discussions. Some interviewees linked such an ability to 
intervene to the personality of delegates and made statements like “maybe there are some 
individuals who feel a bit inhibited and it is very hard to get over that” (Interview SPC2, 
March 2006). However, most participants made a connection between the frequency of 
contributions and other, mostly institutionally coded factors. One of these factors is certainly 
that members with less experience in attending such meetings are less likely to participate 
actively (see also de la Porte, Natali and Pochet 2009). Accordingly, newcomers to the SPC –
for example, delegates from newer member states – are usually described as being relatively 
passive in SPC meetings.  
Another important factor that is referred to in explaining the passivity of some delegates is the 
insufficient human resources and “administrative capacity” (Interview COM, November 2007) 
in national ministries, again especially in newer member countries. As a Commission official 
argued, contributions are very much “dependent on the type of resources the member states put 
in into the room” (Interview COM, December 2007). Several delegates complained about the 
unavailability of enough staff dealing with European issues in national ministries. 
Consequently, representatives are overloaded with work and have difficulties in preparing for 
the meetings sufficiently well. Such problems are also linked to the small size of several 
member states, which makes it even more difficult to have enough people working on related 
issues.  
A related problem is the lack of instructions given to SPC delegates, which makes it difficult 
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representatives of ministers, ministries, governments or states. In case delegates perceive their 
own role in categories of representation, it implies that they do not see themselves as deciding 
on their own what to say and when in SPC meetings. Instead, they act upon a ministerial, 
governmental or national mandate, which mandate is regarded as a resource.  
Besides the above resources that influence the access to the dialogue, there are also other 
differences between delegates with the consequence that certain interventions are more 
influential. The main individual resource mentioned by participants that can influence whether 
an opinion is fully respected is expertise or knowledge (see also Tallberg 2008). An expert is 
“someone who is knowledgeable about the area and knows what they are talking about” and 
whose “contribution is a value” (Interview SPC12, March 2006). Furthermore, an expert is a
person who can present convincing arguments. In connection with expertise, several delegates 
mentioned again the disadvantages of small member states having fewer resources. As the 
argument goes, small member states are not able to send their best experts to SPC meetings, or 
sometimes they are not able to send anybody at all, which certainly hinders their effective 
participation in committee meetings.  
The expertise of SPC members is influenced by their official rank in their ministry for two 
main reasons. First, senior officials are usually more experienced and have more expertise in a 
given policy area, while “young colleagues lack the necessary knowledge to think about
solutions to existing problems” (Interview SPC8, January 2008). Second, senior
representatives are closer to the minister. Because of their expertise and status, senior officials 
can engage more in discussions and can be more flexible in agreeing on a consensual decision. 
In contrast, junior members usually have to wait until they consult their colleagues in the 
capital, which makes it difficult for them to participate in discussions effectively. Regarding 
seniority, there is again an observed difference between older and newer member states 
(Horvath 2008). While SPC representatives from older member states are most often senior 
civil servants, those who come from newer member states are usually younger and less 
influential. One reason behind this difference is the lack of language skills of senior officials in 
newer member states (see also de la Porte, Natali and Pochet 2009).  
Another commonly mentioned source of more effective participation was the size of the 
country of the delegate. Certainly, many interviewees argued that there is no distinction made 
between delegates on the basis of their home country. For example, one of the interviewees 
argued that “from my experience I cannot say that there is a difference made whether little
Luxembourg is saying something, or a huge country like Germany” (Interview SPC14, March 
2006). Nevertheless, some interviewees articulated the opinion that the size of the country does 
indeed influence how much weight a delegate’s opinion has in the debate. In the majority of 
relevant cases, however, this was regarded as an indirect resource linked to better 
administrative capacities. Yet, some participants thought that some representatives were more 
listened to “because their country is more powerful” (Interview SPC3, September 2007).  
An additional resource or source of respect that was mentioned during the interviews is the 
ability to reach a compromise or offer consensual solutions to problems. In this context, newer 
member states are again seen to be in a disadvantaged position: “Due to the different, non-
democratic history, we fall behind the old fifteen in the ability to establish consensual 
solutions, which has been practiced by old member states for forty years” (Interview SPC15, 
July 2007). Other participants discussed this resource of being able to reach a consensus in 
connection to the role of the chair of the SPC (on the role of chairs, see Tallberg 2008). As one 
of the delegates noted about the previous chairman of the SPC, he is listened to because “he 
practices as a voice of compromise suggesting ways to go about” (Interview SPC5, March 
2006).  
Finally, since debates are seen as characterised by arguments among different ‘discourse 
coalitions’(4), being part of a powerful discourse coalition is also considered as a resource in 
the debate. This is especially true in the case of small member states (assuming the importance 
of country size). As a delegate from a small member state noted: 
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country] absolutely disagreed with something, and it was just [our country], I do 
not feel it would stand a chance. But if you find two or three more countries who 
agree with you, then you have a good chance” (Interview SPC1, May 2006).  
There are said to be two different coalitions of member states within the SPC that usually 
represent conflicting positions on diverse policy issues along political-ideological lines. On the 
one hand, one group of countries “would like to see more social Europe, would like to see the 
Lisbon Strategy much more socially oriented, would like to see that the so-called social 
dimension of the Lisbon Strategy is much more strengthened” (Interview SPC/PR1, September 
2007). On the other hand, there are other member states “who more would like to focus on 
growth and employment, as in the new revised Lisbon Strategy” (Interview SPC/PR3, 
September 2007). The balance of power between these discourse coalitions has changed over 
time, especially after the 2004 enlargement. Certainly evaluations depend on the interviewees’
own ‘membership’ in such coalitions: While those who have gained more influence argue that 
a ‘more balanced’ distribution of power helps discussions, those who were in a previously 
dominant coalition and have been losing power to influence claim that such change hinders 
discussions.  
How can these resources be linked to the perceived functions of the SPC? What are the 
resources that are evaluated to be important assuming that the SPC has a political forum 
function? Are these resources different from those shaping effective participation in a policy 
forum? Briefly, the more important it is to represent a relatively fixed mandate, the less 
important it becomes to have professional debates in the SPC. In contrast, the ability to present 
convincing and professionally sound arguments (expertise) is perceived to be important when 
assuming a policy forum function. Seniority is mentioned both in connection to the political 
forum function (senior representatives have better connections to the minister, therefore do not 
need strong mandates) and to the policy forum function (senior members have more 
knowledge). Consensus-seeking is most often referred to in connection with the importance of
promoting the visibility of issues on the European level (political forum function), but in a few 
cases it is evaluated to be important in connection with the policy forum function as well. 
Interestingly, belonging to one or the other discourse coalition is not an indication for the 
commitments or evaluations concerning the political and policy forum functions of the SPC. 
This also means that promoting the visibility of social issues is perceived to be important for 
both coalitions. However, the way interviewees define the dividing line between coalitions 
depends on the perceived function of the SPC. On the one hand, when it comes to substantial 
policy debates (policy forum), the balance of power between discourse coalitions diverging on 
the role of social policy is seen as highly important. On the other hand, when the SPC is 
perceived to be a political forum, such coalitions rather seem to represent the groups of 
member states with different views on the desired strength of cooperation in social protection 
and social inclusion.  
4.4. Summary: Categories of effectiveness within the SPC   
Table 1 summarises the criteria of effectiveness that can be identified based on the empirical
case study. These criteria partly depend on which function of the SPC is envisaged. Thus, the 
table shows the factors that are needed for the effective functioning of the SPC as a policy or 
as a political forum.  
Table 1 
Table 1 also indicates how the empirical analysis can serve as a basis for hypothesis-building. 
The categories show the main factors that can be hypothesised as necessary conditions of 
effectiveness given the assumed functions of a given committee or organisation. These criteria 
are tied to organisations that rely on a consensual form of decision-making. Specifically, in 
case the main role of a committee is to produce politically important consensual documents, 
then it will be effective if members are of a senior rank or if they receive strong national 
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are ideally not too strong or are well balanced in a political committee. However, if a 
committee ought to function as a mutual learning forum, then it can work effectively with 
fewer members who are experts in the given policy fields, as well as with having fewer agenda 
items. Ideally, the members can form an epistemic community with not very strong dividing 
lines between discourse coalitions.  
Both in the case of political and policy fora, it is important for the effective functioning of a 
committee that all members participate equally in the uploading process. Nevertheless, 
different resources are considered to be important for a political forum and for a policy forum. 
In addition, while policy downloading is the main goal for a mutual learning forum – and 
working methods should be designed accordingly – the downloading dimension is secondary 
in case the primary function of a committee is a political one. As a result, the substantial 
outcome of committee discussions can be hypothesised to be different in the case of 
committees with different functions.  
5. Conclusion   
This article set out to explore perceptions of effectiveness within the SPC. It examined how the 
organisation of interactions is evaluated by participating actors and which resources are seen as 
affecting who can be an influential actor in SPC discussions, given the policy forum or the 
political forum function of the committee. This was important to look at because these factors 
influence what kind of policy issues can be uploaded to the European level and by whom, as 
well as the potentials of policy downloading.  
The analysis in this article showed that it is difficult for the SPC to function effectively as a 
policy forum due to the large number and high turnover of representatives and the heavy 
agenda. A potential consequence of the lack of opportunities for SPC delegates to discuss 
questions in more detail is that the European Commission can become more influential in 
shaping the European agenda. Concerning the political forum function of the SPC, this is 
perceived to be endangered by the weak position of the SPC and the policy areas of social 
protection and social inclusion within the Lisbon Strategy. Nevertheless, some argue that the 
distinctiveness of the social OMC can also be regarded as an advantage that enables the 
process to develop its own “identity” (Daly 2006: 476; see also Vanhercke this issue). These 
possibilities can be further explored by analyses that focus more explicitly on the external 
conditions of effectiveness.  
Regarding the effective participation of SPC members, the analysis revealed that SPC 
delegates are perceived to have unequal opportunities to influence discussions, especially due 
to differences in national level factors. Delegates from newer member states are especially 
seen as being in a disadvantaged position. In this reading, newer SPC delegates might find it 
more difficult to upload their agenda to the European level.  
Based on the case study, potential contradictions can also be highlighted between the effective 
functioning of the SPC as a political and as a policy forum. These contradictions have to be 
taken into consideration when evaluating the working methods of a committee. Thus, the main 
functions of committees and other forum-type organisation have to be made clear before 
assessing the applicable criteria of effectiveness. For example, while in-depth discussions can 
be regarded as desirable from a policy learning perspective, they might not be seen as 
necessary for a political committee to function ‘effectively’.  
The continuous (re-)constructions of committees’ different functions are usually neglected by 
studies that assume that the OMC and soft modes of governance ought to be ‘deliberative’ in 
order to operate effectively (see discussions on deliberative governance, for example Cohen 
and Sabel 1997; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Mosher and Trubek 2003; Teague 2001; Zeitlin 
2005). This article showed that while committee interactions are interpreted to be consensual 
by almost all participating actors, in-depth discussions are not always seen as ‘useful’ elements 
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the different purposes of committee interactions are often disregarded by analyses. Multi-
purpose processes imply multiple meanings of effectiveness, which need to be understood in 
order to be able to analyse policy developments within given organisational and political 
frameworks.  
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(*) I am grateful to Sandra Kröger, Johannes Pollak and the participants of the OMC workshop on the 28-29 
November 2008 in Vienna, as well as to two anonymous referees for their invaluable comments on earlier 
drafts of this article. This article and research was supported by the Central European University, the Austrian 
Academy of Sciences, and the RECWOWE Network of Excellence.  
(1) See the Social Inclusion website of DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the 
European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/social_protection_committee_en.htm (last 
accessed 30 January 2008).  
(2) On the social constuction of reality, see Berger and Luckmann (1966).  
(3) The interviews were conducted between March 2006 and January 2008. All interviews are cited by 
category and the date of the interview. In case more interviews were conducted in the same month, a number 
is added to the reference (the numbering is random). The categories are the following: SPC: SPC member; 
SPC/PR: SPC member from permanent representation; COM: Commission official; NGO: NGO 
representative.  
(4) For a conceptualisation of “discourse coalitions”, see Hajer (1993). 
© 2009 by Anna Horvath
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-017a.htm 15Table 1: Conditions for effectiveness  
The most important and differentiating factors are marked in italics.
Effectiveness criteria: main 
categories Policy forum Political forum
Criteria linked to 
the organisation of 
interactions 
Group size 
Smaller number of 
delegates or the 
presence of issue-
specific sub-groups 
Number of delegates 
irrelevant (all actors should 
be included) 
Agenda  Reasonable number of 
agenda items 
Number of agenda items 
irrelevant (all items should 
be concluded) 
Stability of 
representation  No or low turnover rate  No or low turnover rate 
Position of the 
committee 
Inter-committee 
relations not necessarily 
relevant 
Strong SPC 
Criteria linked to 
the distribution of 
resources  
Experience  Equally experienced 
delegates 
Equally experienced 
delegates 
Human resources 
at national level 
Sufficient human 
resources in national 
ministries 
Sufficient human resources 
in national ministries 
Seniority and 
mandate 
Senior members and/or 
experts 
Senior members and/or 
strong national mandate 
Language skills  Good language skills  Good language skills 
Consensus  Consensus-seeking 
attitude  Consensus-seeking attitude 
Discourse 
coalitions 
Not strong discourse 
coalitions ("epistemic 
community") 
Well-balanced or not very 
strong discourse coalitions 
(compromise should be 
reached easily) 
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